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Abstract 
The role of communities in preventing or responding to terrorism and political violence is 
increasingly finding prominence within government strategies, nationally and internationally.  At 
the same time, implementation of effective community based partnerships has been nominal. 
Adding additional complexity to this problem are policies such as Prevent in Britain which was 
arguably developed with good intentions but has received significant and sustained criticism by 
the very communities it sought to engage with. The result has been ongoing discussions within 
community practice and research arenas associated with radicalisation, extremism, and terrorism, 
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as to the role, if any, that communities might play in the counter-terrorism environment. This 
article explores that environment and highlights some of the community based perceptions and 
initiatives that prevail in the UK.  In particular, innovations around the development of 
psychotherapeutic frameworks of understanding in relation to counter-terrorism are discussed, 
alongside the role of connectors. 
Key Terms 
Community, radicalisation, extremism, Prevent, mentoring, counter-terrorism, hard power, soft 
power, psychotherapy, connector. 
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Introduction 
In recent years there has been an increasing shift in various government strategies to include 
narratives about engaging communities in their counter-terrorism efforts. Although terrorism is 
nothing new for many countries, the decline of Al Qaeda as the preeminent threat did little to 
minimize concern. The rise of the Islamic State (IS) in Syria and Iraq immediately reinforced the 
perception that an existential threat and increasingly internal threat of terrorism exists. 
Furthermore, the barbaric nature of IS displayed in the media combined with the migration of 
thousands of 'foreign fighters' from the West going to Syria and Iraq has resulted in high levels 
of anxiety for those in government. Those in Europe are particularly concerned because of the 
large numbers of 'foreign fighters' leaving from and returning to European countries where the 
Schengen Agreement permits free and unobstructed travel across borders.  
In response to the ongoing and the newest threat posed by the current foreign fighter 
phenomenon, governments are proposing more penetrating legislation while simultaneously 
attempting to impose additional 'responsibilities' on communities in order to maximise their 
counter-terrorism efforts. This is particularly true in the United Kingdom (UK) where the 
government recently published its newest counter-terrorism strategy.  The newest rendition of 
the UK's CONTEST strategy is simply titled Counter-Extremism Strategy.
1
 Intended to be 
broader than previous iterations the newest strategy purports to address "the full spectrum of 
extremism: violent and non-violent, Islamist and neo-Nazi – hate and fear in all their forms."2  
And, although the newest strategy is decidedly broader than previous iterations, the government 
makes clear from the start that their focus will remain fixed on Muslim communities when it 
states "The greatest current challenge comes from the global rise of Islamist extremism."
3
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The UK's most recent counter-terrorism strategy is built around four key pillars: countering 
extremist ideology; supporting mainstream voices; disrupting extremists; and building more 
cohesive societies.
4
 The strategy also references introducing new laws designed to challenge the 
most troublesome groups and individuals, explores the possibility of revoking citizenship, and 
strengthens the Office of Communications (Ofcom) to regulate and take punitive action against 
television and radio stations which broadcast unacceptable material.
5
 Although it is not always 
possible to disaggregate the interconnected parts, of particular relevance here is that the strategy 
seeks to build more cohesive societies through a proposed Cohesive Communities Programme 
that will promote opportunity and integration through government/community engagement.
6
  
The possible reasons behind the shift to strengthening community based counter-terrorism 
solutions are numerous and could be argued from a variety of different perspectives. 
Undoubtedly, the government would argue that policing and ultimately crime reduction has long 
established roots within the UK and is exemplified in its Peelian policing model. Whether the 
police are still seen as peers within the community is debatable but the UK government 
continues to promote the legacy of Robert Peel who advocated that the police are merely citizens 
in uniform.
7
 An alternative and perhaps more cynical view is that government is realising that 
despite fifteen years of adopting increasingly invasive and controversial counter-terrorism laws it 
has been unable to legislate or police its way out of the problem of Islamist extremism. 
Individuals continue to radicalise despite efforts to the contrary. As mentioned above there are 
surely other arguable positions but regardless of which explanation seems closest to explaining 
the environment it is clear that the UK government is exercising all of its hard and soft power 
resources to manage its perception of the threat.  
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From a conceptual standpoint, it can be said that government and communities have very similar 
goals when it comes to counter-terrorism in so much as violence is never a tolerable alternative 
in any robust democratic society.  Additionally, because human nature is universal in that no one 
wants to feel vulnerable, the notion of security can be similarly argued as universal at the 
governmental, community, and individual levels. However, problems do arise when one person's 
security is reinforced through the erosion of another person's security.
8
 Moreover, this can 
happen at the individual, group, community, and societal levels. Thus, while security is arguably 
a universal part of human nature, its application is not.
9
 
At the community level the methods to achieve the sense of security can be both remarkably 
similar to government and at the same time significantly different. As an example, community 
resources do not possess the same traditional hard power resources that government has such as 
the power of arrest. At the same time they do possess similar and arguably more effective soft 
power approaches which include defining mainstream boundaries and passive observation of the 
environment.
10
 Moreover, despite the current political rhetoric that one's acceptability in society 
is measured predominantly by one's adherence to 'British values' it is the broader social sphere 
that defines the acceptable margins of society.  
Especially in a country as diverse as the UK, there is also an argument that the margins of 
society are not universal; what is acceptable in one community is potentially not acceptable in 
another. That acceptability can occur for any number of religious, cultural, gender, sexual, or 
ethic reasons.
11
 Examples might include halal or cosher foods, the acceptance of women working 
outside the home, male and female segregated professions, the approval of same sex unions, or 
what clothes are acceptable. Thus, not only do communities establish the boundaries of what is 
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acceptable and what is not, they passively monitor that environment to insure compliance.
12
 
When individuals fall outside of defined communal boundaries they are seen as outliers and eyed 
with scrutiny. This is not entirely dissimilar to government which must attempt to manage those 
who it considers 'insufficiently socialized' and takes steps to control them through force or 
conversion.
13
  Whether viewed from a governmental or community perspective, those outside of 
the margins arguably become the socially excluded 'other'.
14
 Thus governments and communities 
are similarly involved in defining, monitoring, and validating the social order. More directly, 
those within the mainstream are accepted while those outside are not.
15
 Another similarity is that 
each strive to make sure that there are limited unchallenged spaces where individuals can be 
recruited, plan, or execute violent acts. In most cases the police do that through securitization 
whereas communities, faith groups, and community activists do that from a social justice 
perspective.
16
 
Despite the idea that government and communities each have mechanisms in place to monitor 
and ultimately manage the risk of terrorism, their commitment to working with one another to 
achieve the common goal of safety and security for all has not been a homogenous process. 
Although the notion of countering violent extremism (CVE) through the soft power mechanisms 
of community engagement has gained momentum quickly in the policy environment, the 
practical side of that momentum has proven to be far more challenging to implement. As if each 
are negotiating with the other, communities, the police, and policy makers are each attempting to 
define what that partnership should look like. Moreover, although all parties want to broker the 
best deal for their side, all simultaneously realise that it will be the communities who ultimately 
decide whether government is a viable partner. Last, even though there is a desire by 
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communities to engage, government‟s past prioritisation of security over engagement has left 
communities suspicious over any newly articulated desire to work together.
17
     
Backdrop to Engaging Communities 
Historically, there has been a reliance on the ability of the police and security services to disrupt 
criminal activity, or as is more often the case, investigate crimes once they have been committed 
with the goal of arresting those responsible.
18
 Once arrested, individuals are prosecuted and 
imprisoned for their crimes. This approach is classically considered the retributive justice model; 
arrest, conviction, and imprisonment.
19
 The basis of the retributive justice model is that 
individuals convicted of a crime must be punished and thus experience the consequences of their 
actions. This leads to the reality that most policing resources are not organised on the prevention 
of criminal activity but rather the investigation of crimes already committed. However, this 
traditionally based reactive rather than proactive policing model is politically and professionally 
unacceptable in the counter-terrorism environment.  
Counter-terrorism work necessitates that individuals be interdicted before their plot is carried out 
which puts tremendous pressure on the police and intelligence services to seek every and all 
means to disrupt plots before they mature while simultaneously attempting to gather sufficient 
evidence for arrest and conviction.
20
 Thus, from both the political perspective and policing 
perspective there is a constant search for ways to mitigate threats so that risk is managed at an 
acceptable level. The result is that the police and security service are perpetually uncomfortable 
about what it is that they don‟t know.  This reality is not dissimilar to the infamous 2002 quote 
by former US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, who made reference to the unknown 
unknowns as a way to explain his uneasiness regarding possible weapons of mass destruction in 
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Iraq.
21
 The concerns over the unknown unknowns not only epitomises the counter-terrorism 
working environment for law enforcement and security services personnel but also explains at 
least some of the motivation for leveraging every possible resource, including those in the 
community. A concept which is fully understood by communities as well.  
To be sure, in recent years there has been growing emphasis placed upon building social 
resilience to extremist ideologies and organisations.  Several policy documents in Britain, the 
US, Australia and other liberal democratic societies relate the view of the centrality of 
communities in the prevention or support of terrorism.  In Britain, for example, rooted within the 
Northern Ireland experience, „communities defeat terrorism‟ has become a well-entrenched 
counterterrorism maxim as evidenced by the Prevent Strategy.
22
 There has been, and continues to 
be, a significant onus placed on the community's ability to thwart terrorism through campaigns 
such as 'See something, say something' in the US and the 'Anti-Terrorist Hotline in the UK. 
Moreover, to impose a sense of duty, governments are openly advocating that citizenship carries 
with it certain sets of responsibilities, one of which is counter-terrorism.
23
 In the US the 
Empowering Local Partners strategy invokes a sense of duty when it makes the statement "it 
becomes the collective responsibility of the U.S. Government and the American people to take a 
stand."
24
 In the UK, the sense of duty is captured in the statement "our society does not just 
confer rights; it demands responsibilities of us too. You have the freedom to live how you choose 
to live – but you must also respect the freedom of others to live how they choose to live."25 
Linking those responsibilities with the government's interpretation of 'British Values' the strategy 
asserts its demand that all citizens subscribe to those values by further stipulating that "we will 
also consider...how we can more easily revoke citizenship from those who reject our values."
26
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 One of the key linkages to community based counter-terrorism efforts can be found in the 2011 
review of the Prevent Strategy. In that review, the government articulated that vulnerability to 
violent extremism was more likely in some places and communities but simultaneously 
concluded that resilient people, groups and communities have the capability to "rebut and reject 
proponents of terrorism and the ideology they promote."
27
  Similarly, in another 2011 report, the 
UK Government stated that "challenging and tackling extremism is a shared effort. We welcome 
the spontaneous and unequivocal condemnation from Muslim community organisations and 
other faith groups in response to the Woolwich attack."
28
 
29
 The most recent and direct 
demonstration of the UK government's desire to partner with the community in the counter-
terrorism arena is found in its 2015 Counter-Extremism Strategy whereby partnering with the 
community is one of the four key strategic pillars. The strategy states that it would "support the 
individuals and groups who have credibility and experience fighting extremism within their 
communities, by amplifying their voices and helping them where required."
30
 Thus there is 
ample evidence that the UK government has promoted community partnerships within the 
counter-terrorism arena for at least the last four years and arguably as far back as 2007 when the 
Prevent workstream was first introduced into the CONTEST strategy.  
The UK has not been alone in its actions. The US adopted a very similar approach and borrowed 
significantly from the UK when it published its Empowering Local Partners strategy in 2011. 
Although far less detailed than the UK's Prevent Strategy the Empowering Local Partners 
Strategy again emphasizes the role of communities by saying "we will continue to assist, engage, 
and connect communities to increase their collective resilience abroad and at home."
31
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Whether in the US, UK, or beyond, engagement efforts have included a wide range of initiatives. 
Those initiatives are too numerous to list here but actively seek to involve communities, schools, 
universities, youth justice agencies, police agencies and others to counter all forms of terrorism, 
but particularly Al Qaida inspired and now IS inspired terrorism. Widening the net even further, 
engagement efforts have often included the families of violent offenders, those considered non-
violent extremists, and those at risk of radicalisation. Examples include Indonesia, Singapore, 
Saudi Arabia and Malaysia, which all have government sponsored de-radicalisation programmes 
that seek to provide counter-terrorism intervention for mid-ranking and grassroots members of 
radical organisations. Supporting families is typically included as an integral part of those 
programmes as well. Although the family and the offender have different needs, stability and 
support for both is believed to be required if successful de-radicalisation is to be achieved.
32
   
Returning once again to the UK, the 2015 Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill made the Prevent 
programme a statutory responsibility for a variety of community based and governmental 
resources that include: local authorities, schools, universities, health care providers, social 
services, and police agencies.
33
 Within the Prevent workstream the Channel Programme was 
created as a pilot programme in 2007 and is now one of the cornerstones of the government's 
counter-terrorism efforts.
34
 Channel is designed to support teens and young adults who are at risk 
of radicalisation but only in the pre-criminal space.
35
 Channel interventions work on a bespoke 
framework that allows Channel review panels to deliver individualised support based on the 
needs of the individual. The review panels are made up of a wide range of statutory partners but 
are always led by the police and chaired by a local authority representative.
36
 That support might 
include a variety of mechanisms that range from mentoring, life skills counselling, anger 
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management training, education opportunities, sports, job placement/employment assistance, 
family support, drug and/or alcohol rehabilitation programmes, or housing support.
37
 
The original Channel concept has also potentially changed with the latest iteration of the UK's 
Counter- Terrorism Strategy. In previous versions, Channel's aim was always stated as 
"supporting people at risk of radicalisation"
38
 In the most recent publication on Channel 
Guidance it appears the government has changed the stated aim of Channel to "Protecting 
vulnerable people from being drawn into terrorism."
39
  Whether this is simple mission creep, an 
undisclosed plan to expand the Channel Programme, or the conflation that radicalisation is a 
precursor to terrorism is unclear. However, if the intent is to expand Channel, helping move 
individuals away from radicalisation  to protecting those at risk of terrorism' represents a large 
conceptual leap for the Channel Programme. Although those that mentor youth in the pre-
criminal and those that mentor those coming out of prison after serving sentences related to 
terrorism both come from community based resources, they require completely different skill 
sets.
40
 
As inferred above, a similar program exists within the UK‟s National Offender Management 
Service (NOMS) whereby individuals convicted on terrorism related charges, charges considered 
terrorism related, or those that have been identified as being radical or extreme are being paired 
with community based intervention providers as a condition of their license agreements.
41
 
Although the mentoring of youth and those that have progressed sufficiently to the point of 
engaging in criminal activity requires significantly different skill sets, one similarity is that those 
that employ a more holistic approach including social mentoring, employment and housing 
assistance, and educational activities appear to have greater success rates.
42
 Whether there is a 
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plan to merge Channel and the post-criminal mentoring services is unclear but changes do appear 
to be forthcoming. In the UK's latest Counter-Extremism Strategy (2015), the document states- 
Individuals further down the path to radicalisation need a particularly intensive type of 
support. When necessary this support will be mandatory. The Home Office will therefore 
develop a new de-radicalisation programme to provide this support by spring 2016. This 
scheme will be available to be used in conjunction with criminal sanctions.
43
 
Interesting too is that despite the UK government's commitment to providing support and 
mentoring services, there is no measurement of efficacy for either programme.
44
  
Aside from mentoring, the UK government has engaged in several outreach programmes though 
its Prevent workstream. Since its inception in 2007 the aim of Prevent has remained consistent; 
to “stop radicalisation, reducing support for terrorism and discouraging people from becoming 
terrorists."
45
 At its peak, there were 8-10 different nationalised community engagement programs 
operating in the UK and most were run by the police. Programmes varied in content and covered 
a spectrum of issues such as: having community members play the role of a counter-terrorism 
investigation team so that they better understood the process; having the police guide local 
authority representatives as they developed and took action on a fictional counter-terrorism case 
so that local government officials understood the process more thoroughly; workshops on 
radicalisation case studies so that members of the public better understood the process; internal 
programmes for police so that they could minimise community impacts when counter-terrorism 
arrests are made; profiles of missed opportunities where statutory partners might have alerted 
authorities to those planning attacks; engagement with women's groups to create a network of 
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informed and active community members, and bringing together individuals from a range of 
statutory bodies to explain their role in Prevent.
46
    
The references above demonstrate that increasingly, the UK government has been investing 
heavily in its community support and engagement activities. Whether that is out of need or out of 
a desire to maximise its counter-terrorism efforts is unknown but there is clear engagement and 
support activity occurring. That is not to suggest that the role of traditional policing within the 
counter-terrorism environment is being changed but rather is to suggest that the police have 
expanded their role to include community-based resources. There are several reasons for that but 
certainly one key element is that communities have the credibility and capability to effectively 
monitor and engage with at risk and high risk individuals that the police just don't have. 
Although it can be argued that government is clearly asserting its soft power mechanisms to co-
opt community based individuals and resources in its counter-terrorism activities, it can also be 
argued that it has been somewhat slow in developing that resource. As far back as 1981, 
academics such as Crenshaw
47
 and more recently Galam
48
 highlighted the reality that extremists 
and those involved in terrorism are in fact competing with government for community support.  
Whether that support is active or passive is simply a matter of scale.  Moreover, the importance 
of that support should not be underestimated.  A recent report by the New America Foundation 
in response to data obtained from the Snowden leaks concluded that the single largest 
identifiable source for initiating a terrorism investigation came from the category of 
community/family, not the intelligence or police services.
49
 In fact, the community/family 
category outranked law enforcement by more than a 3:1 margin.  Not only does this bring into 
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question the issue of efficacy and value for money, it highlights the need for the police to 
develop more trusting relationships within the competitive community environment. 
Nothwithstanding the discussion thus far, efforts for effective engagement with community 
groups have not gone as planned.  In the UK, the Prevent agenda has backfired in many ways.  
According to Kundnani, the Prevent agenda has destabilised police/community relations by 
casting Muslims as the „suspect other‟, undermined community cohesion, eroded the notion of 
shared values and personal security, and generated widespread mistrust and community 
pushback resulting in additional space for anti-government sentiment; the exact opposite of its 
intended purpose.
50
  These kinds of reactions, coupled with anti-government sentiment, should 
be reason to take pause.  According to Crelinsten “an important element … in understanding the 
emergence of terrorism in any society is an appreciation of the forms that counter-terrorism has 
taken in that society.”51  These examples not only demonstrate the importance of community-
based solutions to counter-terrorism but speak to the unintended consequences that can occur 
when things go wrong.  
In many ways the UK has become the proverbial canary in the coal mine when it comes to its 
counter-terrorism efforts. Reacting to its perception of the 'Islamist threat', in 2000 it began 
adopting some of the most comprehensive terrorism laws of any country in the West. In a 
succession of legislative actions between 2000 and 2015 it has adopted six pieces of terrorism 
law and in doing so it began exercising its hard power prerogative with determination. Despite 
those efforts, there is no sign that the threat is abating. In fact, as argued by individuals like 
Kundnani and those in government, the threat has actually increased both domestically and 
abroad. In response, since 2007 the UK government has put forth significant resources into 
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expanding its community partnerships and utilised a variety of community based resources to 
leverage its soft power, especially where it has neither the trust, capability, or capacity to 
operate. Thus, partnering with community is not only the best option, in many cases it is the only 
option.  
While there are clear successes in some of its mentoring schemes and outreach programmes, 
there have also been clear failures. As noted by Kundnani those failures have challenged the 
government/community relationship and brought widespread and significant criticism to the 
Prevent agenda as a whole.
52
 Acknowledging some of its shortcomings, the UK government 
continues to seek engagement with communities across Britain asking once again for them to 
place their trust in government. However, despite acknowledging that communities are critical 
partners in the counter-terrorism environment and that government has limited ability to monitor 
or influence unchallenged spaces, what seems to be missing is government‟s ability to put its 
trust in the community. Arguably, that is a key factor that will have to be negotiated before any 
meaningful progress and ultimately partnership can be achieved. However, the ability of 
government to relinquish power and/or extend trust is decidedly challenging in the current 
politicised environment. Similarly, because the Muslim communities are decidedly 
heterogeneous, deciding who the community leaders are and which ones to engage with creates a 
whole new set of challenges for communities and government alike. As a result, the most likely 
scenario moving forward seems to be an ad hoc approach whereby communities and government 
exploit opportunities when it is mutually beneficial. Although the scope and function of that 
relationship will be limited, it has the promise of building the necessary trust that will be 
required for a longer, more sustainable, and effective relationship.    
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The relationship between government and communities as discussed is certainly not without its 
specific challenges. However, interdiction and/or disruption is only the first half of the problem. 
Managing those at risk of radicalisation and/or those extreme cases that may opt to use violence 
as a means to communicate their grievances is the second half of the problem. Although 
government sources suggest that programmes like Channel are effective, they are clearly limited 
in both scope and capacity. Similarly, even when momentarily setting aside the negative aspects 
of Prevent, it is arguably limited in its effectiveness at “stop[ing] radicalisation, reducing support 
for terrorism and discouraging people from becoming terrorists.”53 As a result, a new approach is 
needed that can augment existing capabilities. One promising option may be to incorporate a 
more holistic psychotherapeutic approach.  
Therapeutic Approaches for Communities in relation to Counter-Terrorism 
The importance of the role of communities within counter-terrorism efforts offers the potential 
for innovative approaches to be developed.  So far, one under-explored area in research, policy 
and practice has been the application of psychotherapeutic frameworks of understanding and 
interventions within counter-terrorism.  Psychotherapeutic approaches offer insights into the 
connections between thoughts, emotions and behaviour, alongside understandings of how 
individuals experience and undergo change, and as such counter-terrorism efforts could be 
enhanced by the incorporation of psychotherapy.  The contention of these authors is that an 
integrative psychotherapeutic framework is most appropriate for applying to non-clinical settings 
such as counter-terrorism.  Integration involves going beyond the confines of any one 
psychotherapeutic school of thought, to combine a mixture of different approaches into a larger 
framework.
54
 An integrative programme of activity enables the most appropriate 
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psychotherapeutic tools to be applied depending upon the individual, organization, group and 
wider social context.  Currently, there are a few examples of single school psychotherapeutic 
approaches being applied to non-clinical settings.  For example, a compassion focused 
therapeutic approach is being developed in the US in relation to police training, in order to 
promote and develop a police culture that is motivated by compassionate competency, especially 
in light of many instances of abuses of power committed by police officers.  Increasing 
competency in emotional intelligence and emotional regulation is a core aspect of a compassion 
focussed approach, with the argument being that as a result of increased competence here police 
officers will be able to manage more effectively conflict, and they will be able to manage their 
own stress, frustration and anger better, amongst other things.
55
  Integration enables a richer 
combination of therapeutic tools in order to potentially have a greater impact.
56
 
Regarding counter-terrorism, an integrative psychotherapeutic approach would draw upon a wide 
range of different psychotherapeutic traditions in order to develop greater understanding about 
the processes involved in radicalization, and in order also to then create new programmes of 
intervention within community settings.  One integrative framework that can be applied to 
counter-terrorism is that of the Transtheoretical Model (TTM) as developed by Prochaska & 
Norcross.
57
  The TTM is a biopsychosocial model explaining intentional change, and as such can 
be applied to understanding individuals‟ journeys into and out from radicalization.  According to 
the TTM, psycho-behavioural change can be conceptualised through stages, levels and processes 
of change.  There are six stages of change – pre-contemplation, contemplation, preparation, 
action, maintenance and termination.  There are five levels of change that a person can 
experience – at the level of their situational problems, their cognitions, their interpersonal 
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relationships, their family relationships and their own, intra-personal, conflicts.  The processes of 
change within the TTM explain how people undergo psychological and behavioural change: 
through consciousness raising; dramatic relief; self re-evaluation; environmental re-evaluation; 
self-liberation; social liberation; counterconditioning; a helping relationship; amongst others.  
Applying the TTM to radicalisation research and practice can therefore helpfully provide 
understandings about the different stages, levels and processes of change that individuals 
experience and moreover, can then inform the kinds of interventions given to individuals who 
have been radicalised or who are being drawn into extremism.  For instance, a person may be at 
pre-contemplation stage (meaning that they are unconsciously aware) regarding family dynamics 
and any connections to them being radicalised, whilst being at preparation stage in terms of 
becoming prepared to commit acts of violence.  Different processes of change can be applied to 
the different stages of change in this example, as different processes of change are more effective 
when applied at particular stages of change.
58
  So consciousness raising is most appropriate for a 
person at pre-contemplation stage whereas counter-conditioning might be most appropriate for a 
person at a preparation stage of change.  Thus, the suggestion here is that pre-crime and post-
crime interventions can be more effective if informed by the TTM.  Clearly, there needs to be 
research exploring the TTM in relation to counter-terrorism efforts in order to build up an 
evidence base.  Whilst the TTM cannot provide any causal explanations of radicalisation and de-
radicalisation, it can provide insights into the ways in which individuals have experienced 
change.  Interestingly, researchers applying the TTM to deal with drug addiction have suggested 
people can go through the different stages of change in a matter of minutes.
59
  Certainly, this 
would potentially also apply to people experiencing radicalisation.   
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Another example of how an integrative psychotherapeutic approach can be applied to counter-
terrorism efforts is the integration of compassion focussed therapy with cognitive-behavioural 
approaches.  Compassion focussed therapy has been developed by Gilbert.
60
 This involves 
understanding how the brain works and then developing a compassion focussed approach to the 
challenges of being human.  There are three types of affect regulatory systems within the human 
body: drive/excite/vitality (wanting, pursuing achieving), content/safe/connected (soothing), and 
threat focussed (protection, safety seeking).  Compassion focussed therapy raises awareness 
within individuals about the nature of their brains and bodies and how individuals‟ threat systems 
can be over-stimulated.  Techniques to encourage social safeness are promoted in order to 
encourage parasympathetic activity, especially in the myelinated vagal nerve.
61
  Such techniques 
(including breathing, safe space and compassionate imagery) seem extremely relevant for 
community based counter-terrorism initiatives in that they could increase individuals‟ resilience 
to violent narratives that are perhaps evoking a threat based response within recipients.  At the 
same time, a compassion focused approach can help to ease inter and intra community tensions. 
Turning to the integration of cognitive-behavioural psychotherapeutic knowledge, a core theme 
from cognitive-behavioural approaches is that individuals‟ reactions to events are as, if not more, 
important than the actual events themselves. This theme has a long history in that in AD75 
Roman philosopher Epictetus argued that „people are not disturbed by events, but by the view 
they hold about them‟.  In order to raise understanding within individuals as to how their 
thoughts are linked to their behavioural and emotional responses, an ABC model of cognitive-
behavioural therapy has been developed, arising from the work of Albert Ellis (1955).  A stands 
for an activating event, B refers to a belief that responds to that event, C being the consequences, 
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an individual‟s feelings, behaviours and symptoms. Importantly, this model posits that it is 
possible to distinguish between a rational and irrational, and a healthy and unhealthy belief. 
Irrational, unhealthy beliefs are inflexible, illogical, dogmatic and often self-critical, whereas 
rational, healthy beliefs are flexible, logical and consistent with reality.  This model allows a 
focus upon an activating event and then exploring how that event has made a person feel through 
an exploration of their thought processes.  Individuals can then be empowered to swap irrational, 
unhealthy beliefs with rational and healthy ones, thereby impacting positively upon their 
subsequent feelings, behaviours and symptoms
62
.  
Clearly, there are potential connections between cognitive-behavioural therapeutic approaches 
and that of complexity theory in relation to radicalisation.  Complexity theory posits that 
funadamentalism and extremism are processes of complexity shutdown.
63
  Individuals start to 
develop inflexible and dogmatic views, they make generalsiaitons that are not supported by any 
concrete evidence and then ignore alternatives.  From some intervention programmes, it has been 
found that participants can be encouraged to maximise a wider range of their own values in order 
to increase the complexity of their thinking.
64
  New programmes are currently being suggested 
that will draw upon cognitive-behavioural therapeutic models in relation to developing critical 
thinking skills amongst young people in particular, so that they can be more resilient to 
radicalisaiton.  Such programmes include psychoeducation about rational and irrational thoughts 
and common thinking errors, an exploration of the relaitonship between thoughts and emotions, 
and an exploration of healthy and unhealthy emotions and how these link to thinking patterns.
65
  
It is important to roll out such programmes across school and also community settings because 
often there is a limited number of national intervention providers. 
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Additionally, connectors can be trained in psychotherapeutic frameworks and techniques.  The 
importance of the role of connectors within counter-terrorism initiatives within community 
settings has been previously discussed.
66
  Connectors „may act within contexts characterised by 
low political and social trust  …As such, connectors carry the risk of being considered to be 
informants for the police‟.  Connectors also are not necessarily community leaders because they 
can challenge social injustice; however, connectors can have the trust of disenfranchised and 
marginalised individuals who may be at risk of radicalisation. A more recent study of 
connectors
67
 has found that connectors seem to share similar social, geographical and cultural 
backgrounds to the young people that they support, and this gives them the credibility to reach 
out to young people who are distrustful of more formal mechanisms of engagement. The 
connectors themselves have experienced radicalisation, domestic violence, alcoholism, economic 
deprivation, and violence, and it seems to be these experiences that not only inspire them to 
support young people but also these experiences serve as the social glue, connecting them to 
young people.  It is important to stress that the response of connectors is often informal in that 
they rarely seek help from the authorities and are keen to keep young people away from the 
attention of statutory agencies.  The work that connectors undertake in relation to keeping young 
people safe from violence and from radicalisation can therefore be enhanced by training them in 
integrative therapeutic approaches, including training them about the TTM, compassion-focused 
and cognitive-behavioural approaches.  This might be one way of enhancing individual and 
community safety within a counter-terrorism context where there is distrust of the authorities. 
Conclusion 
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Despite government acknowledgements that community engagement and community based 
counter-terrorism efforts are critical in stemming the tide of radicalisation and potential violence, 
the ability to engage effectively, promote trust, and support the role of organically driven 
community based counter-terrorism initiatives remains a work in progress. Whereas government 
efforts in places like the US remain in their infancy, places like the UK have a substantial history 
of developing a variety of programmes and approaches but with varied success. Moreover, some 
programmes have been found to be not only unsuccessful, but in some cases detrimental. Thus, 
the mix and balance of hard and soft power mechanisms is a complex one that is not easily 
achieved.  
Although security remains the ultimate goal of both government and communities, the manner in 
which that goal is achieved differs; governments largely seek security though legislation and 
policing whereas communities seek security through social justice mechanisms. These varied 
approaches epitomise the often dichotomous notions of human security verses state security. 
Similarly, in the counter-terrorism environment there is the growing argument that state security 
will only be achieved when sufficient levels of  human security are in place. Moreover, because 
human security is ultimately perceived though one's thoughts and emotions, and those ultimately 
drives behaviour, there may be a place for a variety of non-government interventions such  as 
therapeutic methods in the counter-terrorism environment. 
Therapeutic frameworks of understanding clearly have a potential significant contribution to 
make to community-based approaches to counter-terrorism.  It is important for policy makers, 
practitioners and community members to be informed about the insights and interventions that 
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therapeutic approaches can provide. This will involve gaining a political and social acceptability 
of using therapeutic approaches outside of a clinical setting. 
Regardless of what approach is used or how hard and soft power is utilised, collaboration and 
cooperation is only likely to occur when there is mutual trust. Moreover, governments will have 
to put their faith and trust in communities before communities will restore their faith and trust in 
government. If and when that happens, more widespread and effective community based 
counter-terrorism will begin. 
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